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Export subsidies on processed foods are an important trade policy instrument for the 
European Union. GATT Article XVI legitimised the use of export subsidies on primary 
agricultural products, under certain circumstances, but forbade the use of export 
subsidies on non-primary products. However it was never satisfactorily resolved 
whether export subsidies could be paid on the primary agricultural products 
incorporated into processed products, such as pasta. The Uruguay Round Agreements, 
and particularly the Agreement on Agriculture (the URAA), apparently legitimised the 
EU’s practice of paying export subsidies on incorporated agricultural products, at least 
while the Peace Clause was in force. With the demise of the Peace Clause the question 
arises whether GATT Article XVI has any residual force, given that the range of 
primary agricultural products exempted by Article XVI from the ban on export 
subsidies is narrower than the list of agricultural products covered by the URAA.  
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Introduction 
n important component of the European Union’s common agricultural policy 
(CAP) has been the export subsidies (or export refunds as the EU’s food 
industry prefers them to be called) granted on the export of processed products 
containing cereals, sugar, egg and milk products – even after the MacSharry reforms 
of 1992, the Fischler reforms of 2003, and the sugar reform that was agreed in 
principle in November 2005. From the perspective of the European food industry, 
these export subsidies recompense them for the additional costs they have incurred 
sourcing raw materials at CAP-supported prices, allowing them to compete on world 
markets. However, export subsidies on processed food products are potentially 
problematic in the WTO. Prior to 1995 they were probably illegal. The provisions of 
the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA), and in particular the so-
called Peace Clause (Article 13 of the URAA), probably made them legal. With the 
demise of the Peace Clause at the end of 2003 their status is uncertain, as conflicting 
WTO provisions seem to apply. Although other authors (notably Chambovey, 2002, 
and Steinberg and Josling, 2003) have explored the implications for agricultural 
subsidies of operating the URAA without the Peace Clause, the particular issue 
addressed in this article does not seem to have been discussed.  
The article proceeds as follows. First, it sets out the GATT provisions on export 
subsidies prior to the implementation of the URAA in 1995. Second, it explains the 
URAA provisions, given the protection of its Peace Clause. Third, it outlines the 
importance of these provisions to the EU. Fourth, it explores the apparent conflict in 
WTO provisions that appears to exist now the Peace Clause has lapsed; and then it 
concludes. 
I. GATT Article XVI 
rticle XVI deals with subsidies. It was amended in 1955, and subsequently had 
two parts: Section A dealing with subsidies in general, and Section B dealing 
with export subsidies. Article XVI differentiated between “primary products”, on 
which the grant of export subsidies – under specified conditions – was permitted, and 
other goods (non-primary products) on which export subsidies were, in principle, 
prohibited (McGovern, 1986, p. 322). In particular, Paragraph 4 of Article XVI reads 
in part, “  …  as from 1 January 1958 or the earliest practicable date thereafter, 
contracting parties shall cease to grant either directly or indirectly any form of subsidy 
on the export of any product other than a primary product which subsidy results in the 
sale of such product for export at a price lower than the comparable price charged for 
A 
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the like product to buyers in the domestic market.” McGovern (1986, p. 322) reports 
that, although “sharply criticised”, several panels in the 1970s considered the dual 
pricing criterion to be met “once the existence of a subsidy had been established”. 
Paradoxically, Paragraph 4 did not apply to all GATT contracting parties until it was 
re-enacted as a constituent part of GATT 1994, because only a minority of GATT 
members had been willing to adopt the necessary implementing declaration (Jackson, 
1997, p. 286). However, scholars do query whether GATT Article XVI has any 
substantive role to play in the WTO legal order: Jackson (1997, p. 290), for example, 
notes that the Uruguay Round Subsidies Code is “sufficiently extensive and detailed 
that for most purposes it seems to supersede the text of GATT Articles VI [dealing 
with antidumping and countervailing duties] and XVI, although there may still be a 
few concepts that would remain embedded in those articles of GATT 1994” (see also 
Desta, 2002, pp. 157-161). We will revisit this below. 
A primary product was “understood to be any product of farm, forest or fishery, or 
any mineral, in its natural form or which has undergone such processing as is 
customarily required to prepare it for marketing in substantial volume in international 
trade” (Ad Article XVI).  
Article XVI was supplemented by the Subsidies Code (Agreement on 
Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) adopted during the Tokyo Round by some, but not 
all, GATT contracting parties. This introduced “an outright prohibition on export 
subsidies for all except certain primary products” (McGovern, 1986, p. 322; emphasis 
added). The difference between the list of primary products associated with GATT 
Article XVI, and the list of certain primary products in the Tokyo Round Subsidies 
Code, is that the latter excluded minerals. 
Thus it was important to determine the stage at which processing turns a primary 
product into a processed product. Is pasta, for example, a processed product? In the 
early 1980s the United States challenged the EU’s grant of export subsidies on pasta. 
The panel, having noted that “neither party had finally contended that pasta was a 
primary product”, expressed its opinion that “pasta was not a primary product but was 
a processed agricultural product” (GATT, 1983a, paragraph 4.2; see also McGovern, 
1986, p. 329).
1  
Whilst accepting that pasta was a “processed agricultural product”, the EU argued 
that the provisions of the Tokyo Round Subsidies Code were unclear, and should be 
resolved by negotiation rather than by a panel. In its view, the “conclusion that the 
terms ‘primary product’ and ‘agricultural product’ are not synonyms, slightly missed 
the point” (GATT, 1983b, paragraph 12). What the EU had argued was that “export   A. Swinbank 
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subsidies on processed products were permissible to the extent that they related to any 
primary products which they contained” (McGovern, 1986, p. 329). There was “no 
obligation to restrict such a subsidy to only those cases where the primary product was 
exported in the unaltered state” (GATT, 1983a, paragraph 3.11). The export subsidy 
on pasta simply provided “fair compensation for European pasta producers for 
purchasing wheat sold on the domestic market at prices higher than world prices as a 
result of the CAP” (Delcros, 2002, p. 225). Furthermore, i) this had been the EU’s 
practice since 1967 when the CAP for cereals had begun; ii) the United States had 
itself once subscribed to this view on cotton and textiles; and iii) countries had signed 
up to the Tokyo Round Subsidies Code “in good faith” and retained “a legitimate 
right … to avail themselves of the interpretation” established through past practice 
(GATT, 1983a, paragraph 3.12). However, a majority of the panel rejected this 
argument (McGovern, 1986, p. 329; see also Desta, 2002, pp. 137-140). 
The case prompted Harris, Swinbank and Wilkinson (1983, p. 345) to remark, 
“The implication of the GATT Panel ruling, if upheld, is that the EC’s use of export 
refunds for processed food products in general is not permissible in GATT. The 
consequence may be a need to revamp the EC’s export refund system for processed 
products ….” However the panel report was never adopted, and the EU continued 
with its practice of granting export subsidies on processed foods.
2 
Article XVI (and the Tokyo Round Subsidies Code) did not allow for an unlimited 
use of export subsidies on primary products. Paragraph 3 of Article XVI urged 
contracting parties “to avoid the use of export subsidies on the export of primary 
products” and established an “equitable share” rule: “such subsidy shall not be applied 
in a manner which results in that contracting party having more than an equitable 
share of world export trade in that product, account being taken of the shares of the 
contracting parties in such trade in the product during a previous representative 
period, and any special factors which may have affected or may be affecting such 
trade in the product.” As many authors have noted, this rule was very difficult to 
apply, despite the attempts to clarify its provisions in the Tokyo Round Subsidies 
Code (see for example Hudec, 1998, pps. 8-12, and Josling and Tangermann, 2003). 
It should be noted that even if not prohibited by virtue of GATT Article XVI, 
export subsidies on primary products could still be actionable under Article VI (in the 
form of a countervailing duty “levied for the purpose of offsetting any bounty or 
subsidy bestowed, directly or indirectly, upon the manufacture, production or export 
of any merchandise”) or give rise to a “nullification or impairment” complaint under 
Article XXIII.   A. Swinbank 
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II. The Uruguay Round Agreements Pre-2003 
n 1 January 1995, with the coming into force of the Uruguay Round 
Agreements, a new era of international trade relations began. GATT Article XVI 
was not repealed: indeed it was retained intact in GATT 1994, one of the Multilateral 
Agreements on Trade in Goods listed in Annex 1A of the Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization  (together with the Agreement on 
Agriculture [referred to as the URAA in this paper], the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures [which replaced the Tokyo Round codes; referred to as the 
SCM Agreement in this paper] and others). However, as we have seen above, the 
scope of the SCM Agreement does lead one to question the present purpose of GATT 
Article XVI. The challenge facing WTO members trying to respect WTO rules, and 
facing panels and the appellate body in interpreting the rules, is that of deciding how 
collectively they regulate trade in any particular instance. 
Article 3 of the SCM Agreement is much stricter than Article XVI: it flatly 
prohibits the use of various subsidies (those “contingent, in law or fact, … upon 
export performance”; and those “contingent … upon the use of domestic over 
imported goods”) except as provided for in the URAA. Furthermore, Article 21 of the 
URAA specifies that “The provisions of GATT 1994 and of other Multilateral Trade 
Agreements in Annex 1A shall apply subject to the provisions of this Agreement.” The 
URAA applies to the “agricultural products” listed in its Annex 1. This URAA list, 
whilst excluding wood, fish and fish products, goes beyond a listing of primary 
agricultural products (as defined in GATT Article XVI) and includes processed foods, 
including pasta. But GATT Article XVI still differentiates between primary and non-
primary products in determining whether or not export subsidies are prohibited and, as 
we have noted, the panel in the unadopted pasta ruling from 1983 had been “of the 
opinion that pasta” (a rather simple processed food) “was not a primary product but 
was a processed agricultural product” (as quoted in WTO, 1995, p. 452).  
Part V of the URAA sets out the export subsidy commitments. Taken in 
conjunction with the modalities document (GATT, 1993), it entitled WTO members, 
on the basis of their past use of export subsidies, to create a product-specific list of 
budget outlay and quantity commitments for the export subsidy practices listed in 
Article 9.1 of the URAA. These listed subsidies include “subsidies on agricultural 
products contingent on their incorporation in exported products”. For developed 
countries, after a phased reduction, these budget outlays on scheduled products were 
not to exceed 64 percent of the 1986-1990 base, and the exported “quantities 
O   A. Swinbank 
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benefiting from such subsidies” were limited to 79 percent of the base. Clearly this 
can be more restrictive than GATT Article XVI: if, for example, the base was zero 
(and the products were not listed, i.e., unscheduled), then no subsidised export was 
now permissible.
3 Furthermore, in contrast to pre-1995 experience, WTO panels have 
found it possible to rule against export subsidies on agricultural products. The export 
regime for Canadian dairy products was found to contravene URAA provisions, and 
elements in the U.S. tax system for foreign sales corporations (FSCs) were deemed, 
inter alia, to grant export subsidies on U.S. agricultural products that threatened 
circumvention of the United States’ bound export subsidy commitments (see van 
Vliet, 2000, pps. 228-231). In Upland Cotton, a highly complex case with many 
ramifications, it was decided inter alia that the U.S. export credit guarantee program 
was not exempted by the URAA and consequently did constitute a prohibited subsidy 
under the SCM Agreement (Benitah, 2005, p. 108). In European Communities – 
Export Subsidies on Sugar, the panel found that the EU’s export subsidy regime 
contravened various provisions of the URAA, but declined on grounds of judicial 
economy to rule whether these elements amounted to prohibited subsidies under 
Article 3 of the SCM Agreement (WTO, 2005a, paragraph 321). 
In setting out the export subsidy commitments in Part V of the URAA, Article 11 
makes explicit reference to “incorporated products”. The text reads, “In no case may 
the per-unit subsidy paid on an incorporated agricultural primary product exceed the 
per-unit export subsidy that would be payable on exports of the primary product as 
such.” This resembles the argument the EU had advanced in the early 1980s in 
defence of its export subsidies on pasta (see above). Paragraph 9 of Annex 8 of the 
modalities document (GATT, 1993) put a slightly different twist on the construct. It 
refers back to Annex 7 of the modalities document, which set out the list of export 
subsidies that would definitely be subject to reduction commitments (reflected in 
Article 9.1 of the URAA), and in particular to f): “subsidies on agricultural products 
contingent on their incorporation in exported products”. Thus budgetary outlay (but 
not volume) commitments were to be established “in respect of subsidies on 
agricultural primary products incorporated in exported products”; but this did “not 
preclude the scope for negotiating commitments on particular incorporated products 
or, where feasible, on quantities”. 
Thus, whilst the latitude that GATT Article XVI had allowed to grant export 
subsidies on primary products had been narrowed by Article 3 of the SCM Agreement 
(by in effect prohibiting export subsidies on minerals, forest products, and fish and 
fish products) and by the budgetary and volume constraints of the URAA (and only 25 
members – counting the EU as one – notified the WTO Secretariat of export subsidy   A. Swinbank 
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reduction commitments: see WTO, 2002, p. 1), its scope had apparently been 
expanded (as compared to its interpretation by the pasta panel) to include 
“incorporated agricultural primary products”. However, in case of potential confusion, 
“export subsidies that conform fully to the provisions of Part V of [the URAA], as 
reflected in each Member’s Schedule” were made “exempt from actions based on 
Article XVI of GATT 1994 …” for a nine-year implementation period by virtue of the 
Peace Clause (URAA Article 13(c)(i)). Quite what is meant by the word “actions”, 
however, will require further consideration in section IV. 
III. The EU’s Use of Export Subsidies on Processed 
Foods 
s a result of the Uruguay Round, only 25 founding members of the WTO were 
entitled to grant export refunds on scheduled agricultural products. Of these, 
only 5 members (Bulgaria, Canada, EU, Norway and Switzerland) notified a 
commitment on incorporated products, although the notifications for New Zealand 
and Panama simply covered “all agricultural products” (WTO, 2002, table 2).  
The EU has made assiduous use of its “entitlement”. It is allowed to grant €415 
million of export subsidies on an annual basis on incorporated agricultural products, 
some 5.6 percent of its overall export subsidy expenditure entitlement. Over the 
period 1995/96 to 2002/03, its actual spend on export subsidies on incorporated 
agricultural products has amounted to 12 percent of its overall spend (author’s 
calculations, based on the EU’s annual declarations to the WTO in the G/AG/N/EEC/ 
document series). Furthermore, it has used virtually 100 percent of its entitlement, as 
illustrated by figure 1. 
During years two to five of the implementation period, based on Article 9.1(b) of 
the URAA, the EU claimed it was entitled to carry forward unused entitlements from 
earlier years.
4 Thus, in both 1998/99 and 1999/2000, it declared expenditures in 
excess of its annual entitlements. However, over these five years, expenditure 
amounted to 97.4 percent of its aggregate entitlement, and in each of the three 
subsequent years it amounted to 97.6 percent or above. This has been a binding 
constraint, and the EU has been forced to ration the allocation of export subsidies to 
the trade (Noble, 2005, p. 7).
5 
The way the system works is that, at the time of export, a subsidy is determined 
based upon the composition of the exported product. This is the EU’s so-called non-
Annex I regime (Harris and Swinbank, 1997, p. 278). Annex I (formerly Annex II) to 
the Treaty of Rome lists the products covered by the CAP. When certain non–Annex I  
A   A. Swinbank 
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Source: Author’s calculations from the EU’s annual declarations to the WTO in the G/AG/N/EEC/ document 
series. These documents are downloadable from the WTO website. Note these numbers have not been 
recalculated to reflect the outcome of the sugar panel ruling. 
 
Figure 1  EU’s Use of Export Subsidy Expenditure Entitlements, All Products and 
Incorporated Products (% of entitlement used) 
 
goods containing certain Annex I products (milk, sugar, cereals and eggs) are 
exported, they become eligible for export subsidies on the incorporated products. 
Although the export refund element on cereals was reduced sharply as a result of the 
MacSharry (1992) and Agenda 2000 (1999) reforms, those on dairy and sugar will 
remain substantial despite the Fischler (2003) and sugar (2005) reforms. If one refers 
to the export subsidies determined by tender in January 2006 for butter and sugar (as 
reported in Agra Europe) and deducts the further cuts in support prices agreed in the 
Fischler reforms for dairy, and in November 2005 for sugar, subsidies of €625 (butter) 
and €132 (sugar) per tonne remain (25 and 32 percent of the new support prices 
respectively). 
EU exports of processed food products eligible for export subsidies under the 
non–Annex I regime have risen sharply in recent years. Exact data are complex to 
assemble, but figures made available on the website of the Confédération des 
industries agro-alimentaires de l’UE (CIAA) suggest that of the €57.8 billion of 
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tariff lines under which such export subsidies could be granted.
6 This latter product 
grouping, selected by the author, saw the value of export sales rise from €6.8 billion in 
1999 to €9.1 billion in 2004, with particularly strong growth in codes 1806 
(chocolate), from €0.9 to €1.3 billion; 1905 (pastries or biscuits), from €1.0 to €1.4 
billion; and 2106 (food preparations), from €1.6 to €2.5 billion. An annual export 
subsidy spend of €415 million represented 6.1 percent of the 1999 export value of this 
grouping of export subsidy–eligible non–Annex I goods, declining to 4.6 percent in 
2004. Overall these are not particularly big numbers, but bearing in mind likely 
trading margins, the fact that they are averages, and that the denominator is doubtless 
too large, they could indicate potential problems in some sectors, particularly where 
sugar and dairy products are important cost components.  
IV. The Uruguay Round Agreements Post-2003 
e suggested above that although there might have been a potential conflict 
between the provisions of GATT Article XVI on the one hand, and the URAA 
provisions on export subsidies for incorporated products on the other hand, the Peace 
Clause resolved the issue: export subsidies were exempt from actions based on GATT 
Article XVI. But the Peace Clause expired at the end of 2003 (or the relevant 2003/04 
marketing year, depending upon interpretation). How then is the matter to be 
resolved? 
One interpretation, offered by Chambovey (2002, p. 311), is that URAA Article 
21.1 (which reads, “The provisions of GATT 1994 and of other Multilateral Trade 
Agreements in Annex 1A to the WTO Agreement shall apply subject to the provisions 
of the Agreement”) gives only a residual role to the other Annex 1A Agreements: that 
these other agreements apply only to the extent that the matter is unregulated by the 
URAA. But if the URAA always prevails, what was the purpose of the Peace Clause? 
Its existence implied that it had some purpose, and that the interaction between the 
URAA and the other Annex 1A Agreements was potentially changed by its expiry. 
Article 21.1 does, after all, refer to “the provisions of this Agreement”, which 
presumably means all its provisions, including Article 13 (the Peace Clause). 
Consequently Chambovey (2002, p. 313) concludes that “the very existence of the 
Peace Clause suggests that the criterion of relationship enshrined in Article 21.1 
cannot be interpreted as a sort of lex specialis providing an exemption from the other 
WTO provisions dealing specifically with the same matters as the URAA. However, 
this should not mean that, in the absence of the Peace Clause, the other relevant Annex 
1A Agreements would automatically apply to the agricultural subsidies” that had 
previously been protected by the Peace Clause. Chambovey suggests taking a middle 
W   A. Swinbank 
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way. But what is that middle way? In particular, did the demise of the Peace Clause 
render export subsidies on incorporated products potentially challengeable under 
GATT Article XVI? 
Chambovey (2002, p. 313) goes on to suggest that “the URAA would supersede 
the other Annex 1A Agreements” in two (potentially overlapping) situations: “to the 
extent of a conflict between provisions dealing ‘specifically with the same effect’”, 
and “when the application of a provision of another Annex 1A Agreement does not 
enable a URAA provision to have appropriate effect”. Although Chambovey does not 
deal specifically with the issue raised in this paper, the thrust of Chambovey’s 
argument suggests that the URAA would still trump GATT Article XVI (see also 
Delcros, 2002, particularly p. 251).  
Chambovey and Delcros, European trade officials from Switzerland and the EU 
respectively, but expressing their personal rather than their institutions’ views, were 
clearly unimpressed by the notion that the demise of the Peace Clause significantly 
changed the prospect of successfully challenging agricultural policies. However two 
U.S.-based academics (Steinberg and Josling, 2003) took a rather different view. They 
declare, “When the Peace Clause expires, the full substantive and procedural legal 
apparatus of the WTO may be used … to challenge EC and US agricultural subsidies” 
(p. 370). Upon expiry of the Peace Clause, “WTO jurisprudence and the ordinary 
meaning of these [GATT 1994, the URAA, and the SCM Agreement] agreements 
indicate that they should be read cumulatively with various elements of all three 
agreements applying to agriculture simultaneously so as to create a coherent, 
integrated system” (p. 374). They suggest that two general principles would apply: 
first, “the more specific agreement prevails over the more general”, and second, 
“under the public international law principle of effective interpretation, wherever 
possible, agreements are to be read to give meaning and legal effect to all the terms”. 
Further, the “principle of effective interpretation has been read to suggest that 
wherever possible, agreements should be interpreted consistently with each other so as 
not to trigger the specificity principle (which could render meaningless language in 
the less specific agreement)” (p. 375). 
Steinberg and Josling go on to suggest six possible legal routes for challenging 
agricultural subsidies after 2003, five of which they suggest are “implausible”; and the 
most unlikely outcome is the determination that agricultural subsidies are illegal under 
Article 3 of the SCM Agreement (2003, pps. 376-377). They argue that it is important 
to distinguish between “legality and actionability”: the Peace Clause “constrains 
actionability through the end of 2003 and does not bear on the question of legality” (p. 
377). Thus Article 3 of the SCM Agreement, given its interaction with the URAA,   A. Swinbank 
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makes legal export subsidies on agricultural products that conform to the provisions of 
the URAA, regardless of the Peace Clause (with the corollary that export subsidies on 
agricultural products that do not conform to the provisions of the URAA are 
prohibited subsidies under Article 3 of the SCM Agreement). However, the Peace 
Clause did exempt export subsidies on agricultural products that conform to the 
provisions of the URAA from actions under Part III of the SCM Agreement (dealing 
with “actionable subsidies”) (p. 378). 
Rather confusingly, in developing their argument, Steinberg and Josling (2003, p. 
378) also state, “GATT Article XVI:4 makes illegal export subsidies for any product 
except ‘primary products’, which includes agricultural goods.” However, as argued 
above, this is contestable. It was not the view of the pasta panel: its view was that 
processed agricultural products (in particular pasta) were not “primary products”, and 
the WTO agreements do not redefine the term “primary products”. Article 3 of the 
SCM Agreement, however, in prohibiting export subsidies does so “[e]xcept as 
provided in the Agreement on Agriculture”. Thus it appears to make illegal some 
export subsidies (on minerals, fish and forest products) that would have been legal 
under GATT Article XVI, and conversely make legal export subsidies on a longer list 
of agricultural products as specified in Annex 1 to the URAA. 
The only reference to GATT Article XVI in the URAA is in the Peace Clause 
(Article 13). As regards export subsidies, Article 13(c)(ii) reads as follows: “exempt 
from  actions based on Article XVI of GATT 1994 or Articles 3, 5 and 6 of the 
Subsidies Agreement” (emphasis added). If GATT Article XVI no longer applies, why 
mention it? If GATT Article XVI still applies, how are its provisions on primary 
products to be reconciled with the SCM Agreement’s provisions on agricultural 
products, bearing in mind the public international law principle of effective 
interpretation, that “agreements are to be read to give meaning and legal effect to all 
the terms”? 
If the sole intent of Article 13(c)(ii) was to make URAA-compliant export 
subsidies non-actionable under Part III of the SCM Agreement (Articles 5 to 7), why 
mention SCM Article 3? There is nothing in the URAA that defines what is meant by 
the word “actions” in Article 13(c)(ii). Although the SCM Agreement refers to 
actionable and non-actionable subsidies (in Parts III and IV respectively), the word 
“action” is not used in Parts III and IV of the agreement. It is first used in footnote 37 
(“procedural action”) in Part V dealing with countervailing measures and the 
application of GATT Article VI. Consequently it is unclear what the word “actions” 
means in URAA Article 13(c)(ii).   A. Swinbank 
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From this we provisionally conclude the following. Whilst the Peace Clause was 
in force, the WTO provisions taken together meant that subsidies on all the 
agricultural products listed in Annex 1 of the URAA were not prohibited, provided 
they were applied in accordance with the provisions of the URAA.
7 However, once 
the Peace Clause lapsed, the list of products in Annex 1 became, potentially, divisible 
into two: primary agricultural products, which were not prohibited by either the SCM 
Agreement or GATT Article XVI; and non-primary agricultural products, which, 
whilst not prohibited by the SCM Agreement, arguably are still prohibited by GATT 
Article XVI:4.  
One of the limited outcomes of the sixth WTO Ministerial in Hong Kong in 
December 2005 was an agreement that, in the context of an overall agreed outcome to 
the Doha Development Agenda, export subsidies would be eliminated by 2013 (WTO, 
2005b, para. 6). In effect, as of that date, the provisions of Part V of the URAA would 
become redundant and could be repealed, and all export subsidies would become 
prohibited subsidies under the SCM Agreement. 
However, a successful conclusion of the Doha Round is not at all certain. In July 
2006 the talks were suspended. If they are not restarted, with a real prospect of 
success, WTO members that had hoped to secure agricultural trade liberalisation 
through negotiation might well resort to the dispute settlement mechanism. A 
challenge to the EU’s export subsidies on processed foods could prove a tempting 
target, if it could be demonstrated that Article XVI:4 now applies. First, to recap, 
Article XVI:4 forbids the “grant either directly or indirectly [of] any form of subsidy 
on the export of any product other than a primary product which subsidy results in the 
sale of such product for export at a price lower than the comparable price charged for 
the like product to buyers in the domestic market”; and in the 1970s several panels 
considered the dual pricing criterion to be met “once the existence of a subsidy had 
been established” (McGovern, 1986, p. 322). Thus a complainant would not have to 
show that its industry had been damaged, or that the EU’s world market share had 
increased, as a result of the subsidy: the existence of a subsidy not authorised by the 
URAA would suffice. Second, it would be the EU’s food processing industry, rather 
than its farmers, that would bear the commercial brunt of a successful challenge. The 
prospect of this could very well strengthen the resolve of the EU’s food industry to 
lobby for further CAP reform. Although an expansion of the inward processing relief 
(IPR) could offer some relief for export-oriented food processors, IPR is of necessity a 
bureaucratic procedure for industry; and it does not appeal to the farm lobby, as it 
provides no market outlet for EU-grown raw materials.   A. Swinbank 
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V. Conclusions 
re-1995, under GATT 1947, whilst export subsidies could be paid on primary 
products under certain circumstances, their use on non-primary products was 
forbidden. The legal status of export subsidies paid on primary agricultural products 
incorporated into processed products (such as durum wheat in pasta) was unclear. The 
Uruguay Round Agreements tightened up the requirements but, by introducing a new 
distinction between agricultural products listed in Annex 1 of the URAA, and all 
other products on which an outright export subsidy prohibition applied, doubtless 
legalised the payment of export subsidies on incorporated agricultural products whilst 
the Peace Clause applied. With no Peace Clause in place, there does seem to be a 
discord between Article XVI:4 of GATT 1994, and the provisions of the SCM 
Agreement and the URAA. This may mean that there is now a GATT Article XVI:4 
prohibition in place that specifies the class of goods (primary agricultural products) 
on which export subsidies can be paid, an approach that is more limiting than the list 
of agricultural products in Annex 1 of the URAA. If the Doha Round remains stalled, 
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Endnotes 
1.   In another unadopted report (EEC – Subsidies on Export of Wheat Flour, 1983), 
the United States had argued that wheat flour was a non-primary product, but the 
panel treated it as a primary product (WTO, 1995 p. 452). 
2.   The pasta case was, however, brought to a formal conclusion in August 1987, after 
an interim agreement in 1986. The EU, in a bilateral deal with the United States, 
agreed that 50 percent of its pasta exports to the United States would be produced 
under inward processing relief (IPR) arrangements (under which the raw material 
would be imported into the EU free of import duty, and the resulting pasta 
exported without export subsidy), and that the export subsidy on the remaining 
exports to the United States would be reduced by 27.5 percent (Commission of the 
European Communities, 1988, p. 113). See Noble (2005) for a description of 
current IPR arrangements. 
3.   Apart from the remainder of this paragraph, the substantive discussion of this 
paper deals with listed export subsidies (i.e., those listed in Article 9.1 of the   A. Swinbank 
Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy    167
URAA) on scheduled products (i.e., those products for which a WTO member has 
entered budgetary and/or subsidised volume commitments in its schedule of 
reduction commitments, as required by URAA Article 3). It does not deal with 
unlisted export subsidies on products, whether scheduled or unscheduled, URAA 
Article 10 on the prevention or circumvention of export subsidy commitments, or 
the use of listed export subsidies on unscheduled products. For a full discussion of 
these complex issues see Desta (2002, chapters 6-8). 
4.   Leetmaa and Ackerman (1998, p. 22) claim this was a wrong interpretation: that 
the provisions instead allowed countries in this transitional period to “pay back” 
any permitted overspend they had incurred in earlier years. See also Desta (2002, 
pp. 267-277). 
5.   However, the 2004 enlargement of the EU from 15 to 25 member states has 
relaxed this constraint, in that refunds had previously been paid on EU-15 exports 
to the new member states (Noble, 2005, p. 5). This raises the question, not 
discussed here, of the appropriateness of applying this EU-15 limit to EU-25. 
6.   http://stats.ciaa.be/pages/homepage.asp accessed 1 December 2005. Original data 
from Eurostat and Comext. Author’s extraction. 
7.   They could still be subject to countervailing duties, and the Peace Clause only 
insisted that members show “due restraint in initiating any countervailing duty 
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